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by E. H. MORREIM*
Introduction
A remarkable, but remarkably under-discussed, feature of U.S.
healthcare is that for nearly three decades the federal government has
required hospitals to hand out billions of dollars of free care every
year. Medicare, enacted in 1965, insured healthcare for elderly and
certain disabled people Twenty years later, the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986 ("EMTALA"), was added.
It requires every Medicare-contracting hospital with an emergency
department ("ED") to screen and stabilize anyone who arrives with a
potential emergency condition, regardless of whether the patient can
pay.' Additionally, hospitals may not transfer an unstable patient to
another provider, absent very specific conditions.4 Furthermore,
hospitals with specialty services, such as burn units or Newborn
Intensive Care Units ("NICUs"), must accept transfers of patients
who need them, even if that hospital has no ED.5 When patients
* Professor, College of Medicine, University of Tennessee; J.D., University of
Memphis School of Law; Ph.D., University of Virginia. The author acknowledges with
sincere gratitude the very helpful comments provided on earlier drafts of this paper by
Peter D. Jacobson, J.D., M.PH; Philip Hamburger, J.D.; Thomas Mayo, J.D.; Charles Key,
J.D.; Alena Allen, J.D.; Amy T. Campbell, J.D.; and Lance Stell, Ph.D.
1. Title XVIII appears in the U.S. Code as §§ 1395-1395 ccc, Subchapter XVIII,
Chapter 7, Title 42.
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West 2015).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(f) (2015) ("A participating hospital that has specialized
capabilities or facilities [including, but not limited to, facilities such as burn units, shock-
trauma units, neonatal intensive case units, or, with respect to rural areas, regional referral
centers (which, for purposes of this subpart, mean hospitals meeting the requirements of
referral centers found at Sec. 412.96 of this chapter)] may not refuse to accept from a
referring hospital within the boundaries of the United States an appropriate transfer of an
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cannot or will not pay, the hospital must simply shrug and absorb the
loss. Thus, EMTALA vastly expanded Medicare's initial scope of
beneficiaries and provider obligations and imposed enormous
financial liabilities. Surprisingly, neither the Supreme Court nor any
of the Circuit Courts have addressed EMTALA's constitutionality.
EMTALA is constitutionally flawed on two levels. The first
level-in which EMTALA imposes takings with no provision for just
compensation-has been described elsewhere6 and need only be
briefly reviewed here. On this view, government forces one party-
the hospital-to transfer personal property, such as costly
pharmaceuticals, to another party-the patient-and to permit
patients to invade its spaces, such as ER cubicles, OR suites, and ICU
beds. Fundamentally, it would be no different if the government
forced every Ritz Carlton and Marriott hotel to open their rooms to
the homeless on cold nights, with no compensation whatsoever for
the invasion of space or for the consumption of staff time and
supplies. On this first level, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is
violated every time such EMTALA-mandated care lacks just
compensation. Constitutional violations at this level are episodic,
depending on whether the hospital has been adequately paid.
Takings are permissible.7 Failure to compensate them justly is not.'
The second level, discussed in this Article, proposes that
EMTALA as a whole is unconstitutional, or more specifically, an
"unconstitutional condition" imposed on hospitals' participation in
Medicare. When creating a benefit program, such as Medicare, the
government may rightly attach "strings" to ensure that public funds
are spent as Congress intended.9 Hence, it might be supposed that
even if EMTALA imposes takings, there is no problem. Medicare
participation is voluntary, hence so are EMTALA's burdens. These
burdens are simply a condition tied to federal money. If hospitals
want to be free of it, they can stop contracting with Medicare or close
their EDs and specialty units.
individual who requires such specialized capabilities or facilities if the receiving hospital
has the capacity to treat the individual.").
6. See E.H. Morreim, Dumping the 'Anti-Dumping' Law: Why EMTALA Is
(Largely) Unconstitutional and Why It Matters, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. (2014).
7. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
8. Id.
9. See Robert M. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966).
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This argument fails. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
holds that the government cannot with impunity require persons to
waive fundamental constitutional rights as a condition for receiving a
government benefit. Although the jurisprudence in this area is not a
model of clarity, this Article will show that by forcing hospitals to
abdicate their Fifth Amendment right against uncompensated
takings, the EMTALA oversteps the Supreme Court's boundaries
limiting permissible federal spending.
This is not to suggest that patients should be left crushed and
bleeding while hospital staffs search the wreckage for an insurance
card. The mandate that hospitals care for emergency patients should
stay, and patients who can pay are of course legally obligated to do
so. Quantum meruit. But, for those who cannot or will not, the
government is obligated to make good. ° The government that
mandates the transfers of property must ensure just compensation.
Realistically, EMTALA, as a longstanding statute, may not be
reconfigured any time soon. Still, it is important to consider the
constitutional legitimacy of legislation carrying such an enormous and
growing impact.
Part I begins with a brief overview of how EMTALA imposes
takings, followed in Part II by an overview of "unconstitutional
conditions" jurisprudence.
Part III extracts four particularly salient elements from that
jurisprudence. The first element is a threshold triggering closer
scrutiny: when the government indirectly attempts to extract a
concession that it cannot directly demand under the constitution, a
closer look is imperative. For instance, if the government cannot
directly impose restraint on free speech, then we must look very
closely when a government grant carries speech restraints.
The second element is relevance ("germaneness"). The
condition the government places, e.g., on participating in a benefit
program or regulating land use, must be relevant to the purpose of
the program or regulation. For example, a government regulation
that reduces flood risk by limiting how much land a shop owner can
pave for a bigger parking lot is quite different than a government
regulation that forces a shop owner to donate green space for public
recreation.
10. See Morreim, supra note 6, at 257-59. Where the government takes property
from one private party and gives it to another, the government becomes a guarantor
where the party whose property was taken will be justly compensated.
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The third element is proportionality. If the state can legitimately
extract a concession in exchange for a benefit or regulatory approval,
that concession must not be seriously disproportionate to the
magnitude of the benefit. Thus, even if the government can rightly
demand that the shop owner dedicate a reasonable bit of land to
flood control, it could not require her to buy a huge parcel of land
elsewhere in the county to improve the county's overall flood
control-thereby extracting an unduly large concession simply
because the shop owner really needs the extra parking space.
The fourth element is coercion, which plays a significant role
throughout the analysis. As Justice Scalia put it, some conditions
attached to government benefits actually become "an out-and-out
plan of extortion."'"
On the basis of these considerations, Part IV argues that
EMTALA is an unconstitutional condition tacked onto Medicare.
I. EMTALA and Fifth Amendment Takings
The Fifth Amendment provides, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."12  Hence, the
elements of a Fifth Amendment taking are property, a taking, and
public use. Once these are satisfied, the government must pay just
compensation.13
A. Property
The most familiar kind of taking concerns real property. For
example, if the state needs to build a road through Farmer Brown's
land, it takes title, pays Brown, and builds the road. Personal
property, however, is equally susceptible to government taking. This
includes money, intellectual property, such as trade secrets, and
ordinary everyday objects. 4
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this point in Home v.
USDA, which concerned a New Deal-era law requiring raisin growers
to hand over a substantial portion of their crop every year as part of a
11. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,837 (1987).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. See Morreim, supra note 6, at 211-86 for considerably greater detail and case law
explaining how EMTALA imposes takings.
14. See Morreim, supra note 6, at 222-31.
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program to stabilize market prices.15 The plaintiffs, raisin growers,
refused and dubbed the requirement a taking. The Court agreed,
emphasizing that personal property and real property are equally
subject to the Takings Clause. It held that "[n]othing in the text or
history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the
rule is any different when it comes to appropriation of personal
property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay just
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your
home."16
Here, EMTALA requires hospitals to provide ED patients with
personal and real property, ranging from costly pharmaceuticals and
medical devices, to paid employee time and the rental value of
various spaces, such as an ED cubicle, OR suite, or ICU bed.17
Although technically a hospital's EMTALA obligation ends when
someone is admitted as an inpatient, 8 EMTALA-generated costs
often include ongoing inpatient expenses. After all, hospitals can no
longer transfer an unstable, indigent patient to a charity hospital as
they could before 1986."M And as noted, EMTALA also requires
hospitals with specialty facilities (burn units, NICUs, etc.) to accept
transfers from hospitals lacking such facilities-whether or not the
15. Horne v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015). As part of a 1937 government
program to stabilize the market price of raisins, growers were required to turn over a
specified percentage of their crop every year, after which the government might donate
them, sell them in a noncompetitive market, or otherwise dispose of them. Net proceeds,
if any after deducting the government's expenses, would be rebated to the growers. In
2002-03, growers were required to set aside forty-seven percent of their crop, and thirty
percent in 2003-04. This resulted in a complex history of litigation, in which the federal
government maintained that its program did not impose takings at all.
16. Id. at 2426. The Court's phrasing closely parallels this author's phrasing from
2013: "If the state commandeers my car, how does it help that I am still free to use my
garage for something other than sheltering a car? They still took my car." See Morreim,
supra note 6, at 276.
17. See Morreim, supra note 6, at 226. ("Importantly, the hospital itself is not the
'property' in question. Rather, the hospital is the (corporate) 'person' whose property is
taken.").
18. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2)(i) ("If a hospital has screened an individual under
paragraph (a) of this section and found the individual to have an emergency medical
condition, and admits that individual as an inpatient in good faith in order to stabilize the
emergency medical condition, the hospital has satisfied its special responsibilities under
this section with respect to that individual."). See also Lopez v. Contra Costa Reg'l Med.
Ctr., 903 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
19. This is precisely what was mandated by Arizona in the pre-EMTALA events of
St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Maricopa Cty., 786 P.2d 983 (Ariz. 1989).
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patient can pay.20  Thus, EMTALA costs can substantially exceed
those generated in the ED.21
B. Public Use
EMTALA takes hospitals' property for the public purpose of
ensuring access to emergency care, regardless of an individual's
ability to pay. Surely we can endorse this requirement, since any of
us could be emergently ill or injured with no insurance card on hand.
As an affluent society, we may cross the wrong moral line if we throw
a dying person out onto the streets, solely because he cannot prove
his solvency.
Admittedly, these takings are not the usual citizen-to-
government, Farmer Brown-type transfers. Rather, they are
government-mandated property transfers from one private party (the
hospital) to another (the patient). However, in 2005, the Supreme
Court affirmed this kind of taking in Kelo v. City of New London.22 In
Kelo, the city of New London attempted to revitalize the city's
faltering economy by requiring homeowners to sell their land-
including waterfront homes that had been owned by the same family
for generations-to private developers as part of a community
revitalization plan.23 Homeowners protested that a forced sale to a
private party could not qualify as "public use" under the Takings
Clause, and therefore violated the Takings Clause.24 The Court held
that such government-mandated private-to-private transfers can
indeed qualify as takings for "public use," and thus, can permissibly
be mandated as long as there is payment of just compensation. 2' By
implication, EMTALA's required private-to-private (hospital-to-
patient) transfers can equally qualify as takings for public use.
20. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(f) ("A participating hospital that has specialized capabilities or
facilities (including, but not limited to, facilities such as burn units, shock-trauma units,
neonatal intensive case units, or, with respect to rural areas, regional referral centers
(which, for purposes of this subpart, mean hospitals meeting the requirements of referral
centers found at § 412.96 of this chapter)) may not refuse to accept from a referring
hospital within the boundaries of the United States an appropriate transfer of an
individual who requires such specialized capabilities or facilities if the receiving hospital
has the capacity to treat the individual.").
21. For further discussion, see Morreim, supra note 6, at 228-29.
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C. Takings
There are two basic types of taking: "per se takings" and
"regulatory takings." Per se takings are the oldest and most familiar,
as with Farmer Brown's land. The government ousts the original
owner and becomes the new owner.
6
Regulatory takings are a later construction.27  Originally
emerging from land-use regulations, they attempt to strike a balance
between compensating the public and allowing the government to
serve the common good without being forced to pay.' On the one
hand, the government has considerable authority to limit what people
do with their property, as in zoning regulations that, while promoting
the common good, can adversely affect the value of a property.29
Perhaps I would like to transform my home into a geriatric strip club
for aging Baby Boomers. Alas, if my house sits next door to an
elementary school, the zoning board will likely disapprove. Although
the home's value would be greatly enhanced by octogenarian pole-
dancers, I must absorb the loss with grace.
On the other hand, sometimes government regulation is so
intrusive that it essentially amounts to an ouster requiring
compensation.0 The property does not actually change hands, but its
value is so diminished that the government action is a regulatory
taking requiring just compensation. For example, in United States v.
Causby, low-altitude flights from a military airfield so upset the flocks
at Lee Causby's chicken farm, the Supreme Court found Causby's
poultry business had become nonviable and required the government
to pay the farmer for its taking even though Causby still owned the
property.3 By 1978, the Court provided several criteria to help courts
determine whether a particular regulation was simply the price of
living in a community, or whether it had such adverse effects on a
property's value that it amounted to a regulatory taking requiring
32
compensation.





31. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
32. In Pennsylvania Central v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the Court
identified three criteria to assess whether a regulation amounted to a taking: (1) the
regulation's economic impact on the claimant; (2) the extent to which it has interfered
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Subsequently, the Court refined its schema to identify two types
of per se takings, expressly distinguishing them from the regulatory
takings discussed just above: (a) complete destruction of the
property's value and (b) physical invasion or occupation. The first
type- complete destruction of value-emerged in 1992 in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Commission. In Lucas, plaintiff David
Lucas bought oceanfront land to build a housing development,
subsequent zoning restrictions rendered the land unusable for that
purpose:3 Because all economically beneficial uses of Lucas's
property had been precluded, the Court found a per se taking.35 This
was not a mere regulatory diminution of Lucas's land value; it was
equivalent to a complete ouster, even though he technically still
owned the property. Thus, compensation was required, and no
regulatory impact analysis was necessary.36
The other type of per se taking-physical invasion or
occupation-was articulated in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.37 As the cable-television industry emerged during the
1960s and '70s, New York State authorized cable companies to install
their equipment on sides and tops of buildings, including Jean
Loretto's apartment building.38 Although only small portions of
Loretto's building were occupied by the cables and boxes, the
Supreme Court found that these installations constituted a physical
invasion and therefore a per se taking, requiring compensation.39
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission. v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CA TV Corp. is also apt.4° In that case, the Corps of Engineers' dam-
control activities caused intermittent flooding on state game and fish
lands, necessitating costly environmental repairs after every flood.41
The Supreme Court unanimously held that this intermittent flooding
with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government action-
e.g., whether it features a physical invasion.




37. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
41. Id.
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was a taking requiring compensation, even though the floods did not
constitute a permanent invasion of the land.42
EMTALA's takings should now be evident. They are not about
land-use regulation. Rather, hospitals are the "persons" whose
property is subjected to per se takings of both types. First, the value
of personal property is completely destroyed: the costly
pharmaceutical or bandage is entirely consumed, and the hour of
nursing or physician time is completely spent. Second, spaces are
routinely invaded-the ED cubicle, the operating room, and the ICU
bed. EMTALA thus subjects hospitals to an "intermittent flood" of
needy patients.43 Throughout, the hospital has entirely lost "the rights
to possess, use and dispose of" these specific properties in any way
other than to serve this particular patient.44 When a party loses these
rights, she has effectively lost the entire "bundle" of property rights
and hence, suffered a per se taking. 5
It would be no different if the government required that on cold
nights, every Ritz Carlton, Hilton, and Marriott must open their
rooms to the homeless, yet provided no compensation either for the
invasion of space or for the consumption of staff time, towels, and
toiletries.
A predictable response would be that there is no problem
because EMTALA is simply a requirement for participation in
Medicare. 46  Hospitals are not forced to participate. They can
42. Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015) also drives the
point home. There, a raisin program resulted in a direct appropriation of property-a
"clear physical taking"-and not a regulation of property. Id. at 2428. Even though the
raisins might remain in the grower's hands, as they did with the Hornes, title had been
transferred to the government, which exercised complete control. Id. at 2429. As such,
the program imposed per se takings requiring just compensation with no further analysis.
The fact that government might later pay growers a bit of leftover money did not excuse
them from the initial obligation to pay. Id.
43. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 U.S. at 519. See Morreim,supra note 6, at 226.
44. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982).
45. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435).
46. Hospitals that accept payment under Medicare ("participate" in the program)
can be terminated if they fail to meet EMTALA obligations. Per 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(g)
(2015), if "a hospital fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) through (e) of
this section, HCFA [now CMS] may terminate the provider agreement in accordance with
§ 489.53." And per 42 C.F.R. § 489.53(b)(1) (2015), CMS can terminate a hospital's
provider agreement with Medicare if "[t]he hospital fails to comply with the requirements
of § 489.24 (a) through (e), which require the hospital to examine, treat, or transfer
emergency medical condition cases appropriately, and require that hospitals with
specialized capabilities or facilities accept an appropriate transfer," or even if a hospital
fails to report another hospital for suspected EMTALA violations, as required under §
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withdraw from the program or can shut down the EDs and specialty
facilities EMTALA covers, thereby freeing themselves from all such
obligations.47
Home provides one very direct response:
The Government contends that the reserve
requirement is not a taking because raisin growers
voluntarily choose to participate in the raisin market.
According to the Government, if raisin growers don't
like it, they can "plant different crops," or "sell their
raisin-variety grapes as table grapes or for use in juice
or wine.... [T]he Government is wrong as a matter of
law. In Loretto, we rejected the argument that the
New York law was not a taking because a landlord
could avoid the requirement by ceasing to be a
landlord. We held instead that "a landlord's ability to
rent his property may not be conditioned on his
forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical
occupation.,
48
In other words, Loretto could not be required to give up her
Fifth Amendment right against uncompensated takings, as a
condition for participating in the apartment rental marketplace.
Neither could the Hornes be required to give up their right against
uncompensated takings as a condition of participating in the raisin
market. Directly parallel, this Article argues that hospitals should not
be required to give up their right against uncompensated takings, as a
condition of participating in the Medicare program. As we will now
489.24(e) and under § 489.20. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.53(b)(2) (2015). Shy of complete
termination from Medicare, violations of EMTALA can trigger civil monetary penalties of
up to $50,000 per violation, plus civil suits against the hospital by patients adversely
affected. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(d)(1)(A), 1395dd(d)(2). Clearly, hospitals have no choice.
47. See, e.g., Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963, 972 (11th Cir. 1986); Minn. Ass'n of
Health Care Facilities v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d. 442, 445-46 (8th Cir.
1984); Methodist Hosp. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp. 1309, 1335 (N.D.
Ind. 1994) (citing Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1993)); Burditt v. U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991); Matter of Review of
Health Care Admin. Board, 415 A.2d 1147 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed sub nom; Wayne
Haven Nursing Home v. Finley, 449 U.S. 944 (1980).
48. Home, 135 S. Ct. at 2430 (citation omitted). The court added that "[t]he Taking
here cannot reasonably be characterized as part of a... voluntary exchange." Id. (citing
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439)).
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see, this reasoning essentially invokes the concept of
"unconstitutional conditions."49
II. Unconstitutional Conditions: An Overview
Medicare creates a fairly ordinary insurance contract between
healthcare providers (here, hospitals) and the government. Like
many insurers the government seeks program integrity to ensure that
beneficiaries receive the appropriate quality and quantity of goods
and services, and that billing is done correctly. Such requirements,
dubbed "conditions of participation" ("COP")," are essentially
health, safety, and financial standards.
EMTALA is a completely different genre of COP. 1 It has
nothing to do with assuring quality or quantity of care for
beneficiaries, or proper billing for the payer. Rather, it takes
advantage of hospitals' financial dependence on Medicare
participation, to demand that they hand out goods and services
completely outside of Medicare's target population-the elderly and
disabled-for an entirely different purpose and population, namely,
anyone who comes to the ED with a possible emergency condition or
needs specialty services. In so doing, the statute arguably imposes
what the Supreme Court dubs an "unconstitutional condition."
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is not crystal clear,
but consider the following analogy: Suppose the government said to
physicians "we want to make it easier to prosecute doctors who
commit Medicare fraud; hence, if a doctor wants to care for Medicare
patients he must waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination." It would be little different than telling hospitals "if
you want to care for Medicare patients you must give up your Fifth
Amendment right against uncompensated takings." Something seems
very wrong, but what precisely is the problem?
49. The Home and Loretto Courts do not expressly invoke the doctrine, perhaps
because the "participation" in question is a commercial market rather than a government
program. However, the reasoning is fundamentally similar and, as discussed below,
EMTALA does concern participation in a government program and hence can fall directly
under the umbrella of unconstitutional conditions.
50. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 482, 485, 410, and various related regulations specifying quality
and quantity of services and providers CMS expects for Medicare beneficiaries.
51. EMTALA is perhaps not literally a "Condition of Participation" for hospitals,
since it is not found in 42 C.F.R. § 482. However, it is still a "condition" in the sense of
being a requirement, and it must be satisfied for any hospital to "participate," i.e., to be
paid under a provider agreement, in the Medicare program.
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The applicable jurisprudence steers a course between two
important principles. On one hand, just as the federal government
may tax and spend for the general welfare,52 it may also make sure its
funds are used as intended-to place conditions on the funds' use and,
more broadly, to place conditions on other government benefits such
as land-use permits.53 Thus, a humanities grant that supports one type
of art over another by, for example, funding classical music instead of
jazz, does not censor jazz. It is simply a decision not to subsidize jazz
at this time.
The Court applied this principle in Rust v. Sullivan, when it ruled
that the government could properly forbid using federal funds to
promote abortion as part of a family-planning grant.54 After all, the
Court reasoned, the recipients of those funds still had other ways to
advocate abortion if they wished to. They simply were restricted in
their use of those particular funds.5 Per the Court:
The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage
certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in
another way. In so doing, the Government has not
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other.56
On the other hand, there are lines the government must not
cross. The Constitution provides important protections, particularly
in the Bill of Rights, which must not lightly be abandoned to coerce
people to behave in certain ways. "[T]he relevant distinction that has
emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the limits of
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 1.
53. For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional
Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 481 (2012). See also Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1460 (1989).
54. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
55. Id. at 1772.
56. Id. Similarly, "[pleople who work for the CIA accept that they will have less
freedom of speech than if they worked for McDonald's, but since the condition is a
reasonable one the restriction on their freedom of speech is not considered
unconstitutional." Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2000).
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the government spending program-those that specify the activities
Congress wants to subsidize-and conditions that seek to leverage
funding to regulate ... outside the contours of the program itself.,1
7
As the Court observed in 1926, improperly imposed conditions can
leave people with "a choice between the rock and the whirlpool ....
[T]he power of the state... is not unlimited, and one of the
limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require
relinquishment of constitutional rights. 58  The Court has further
noted:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has
made clear that even though a person has no "right" to
a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests ......
Thus, in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International (AID), a government program to combat HIV
required that funding recipients espouse a general policy opposing
prostitution.60 Clearly, a straight-out government mandate that a
person or organization must oppose prostitution would offend the
First Amendment.6' In AID, the Court held that this very same
mandate, imposed as a condition for receiving federal funds, ran afoul
57. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328
(2013).
58. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). As
one commentator put it, "[w]e would not think that the mugger's implicit threat of 'your
money or your life' is morally acceptable simply because the statement can be thought
about as a deal involving risks." Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional
Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional
Law and Theory, 5(1) J. LEGAL ANALYSiS 61, 18 (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2186423.
59. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
60. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
61. Id. at 2327 ("It is, however, a basic First Amendment principle that 'freedom of
speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.'... Were [the
AID anti-prostitution policy] enacted as a direct regulation of speech, the Policy
Requirement would plainly violate the First Amendment. The question is whether the
Government may nonetheless impose that requirement as a condition on the receipt of
federal funds.").
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of the Constitution because it regulated speech beyond the contours
of the funded program.62
Unconstitutional conditions case law spans the Bill of Rights
quite broadly. First Amendment cases involve a variety of free
speech issues63 as well as freedom of religion issues.64 A Fourth
Amendment example inquires whether mandatory drug testing as a
condition for receiving welfare benefits runs afoul of search andS 61
seizure constraints. Plea bargains in criminal cases can raise Sixth
Amendment questions about the right to trial by jury.66 And Tenth
Amendment issues can arise where conditions on federal funding may
usurp states' rights. In South Dakota v. Dole, for instance, the federal
government conditioned states' receipt of federal highway funds on
their willingness to set their legal drinking age at twenty-one. 67
Although states have a constitutionally protected right to make their
own decisions in such matters, the Supreme Court upheld the
condition because the funds' purpose included highway safety. 
6
Of particular interest here, several cases concern the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause-the Court's most recent focus in its
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence. 69  In 1987, Nollan v.
62. Analogously, in Sinderman, a college professor lost his employment for speaking
out about a policy issue, prompting the Court to opine: "[T]he government may not place
a condition on the receipt of a benefit or subsidy that infringes upon the recipient's
constitutionally protected rights, even if the government has no obligation to offer the
benefit in the first instance." 408 U.S. at 597. See also FCC v. League of Women Voters
of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, 547
U.S. 47, 59 (2006); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983);
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484 (1996). See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) for the Court's reaffirmation of Perry's principle
as recently as 2013.
63. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 364.
64. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1426.
65. Ilan Wurman, Note: Drug Testing Welfare Recipients as a Constitutional
Condition, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2013); Ilan Wurman, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, JURIST (Mar. 13, 2013), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/03/
ilan-wurman-drug-testing.php.
66. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001).
67. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
68. Additionally, the Court observed that, since only five percent of highway funding
was at stake, the condition could not be deemed coercive. For further discussion of Dole,
see Ren6e Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional
Review Boards, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 775 (2007) and Berman, supra note 66.
69. Berman, supra note 66, at 89.
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California Coastal Commission was decided just three days after
South Dakota v. Dole. The California Coastal Commission required
that, as a condition for replacing their beachfront bungalow with a
larger home, James and Marilyn Nollan grant an easement permitting
the public to traverse their property from a state beach on one side to
another public beach on the other side." The Commission's proffered
reason: The Nollans' new home must not obstruct the public's view of
the ocean.72
Although the Nollan Court did not expressly invoke
unconstitutional conditions, the case was effectively the first to bring
the Takings Clause under the doctrine. Per the Court, the
Commission had every right to reject the Nollans' request outright, if
necessary to protect the public's view of the ocean.74 However, the
required easement did not serve the Commission's purpose of
protecting visual access." Rather, the Commission was using its
authority as leverage to extract something additional-a convenient
way for the public to walk from one beach to the other via the
Nollans' property. 6 As observed by Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority: "The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however,
if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further
the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.,
7
Without an "essential nexus"-a clear connection between the
specific purposes sought by the legislation and the constraint placed
on the citizen-the Commission's condition would be, not a "valid
regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."'7 8 In the
end, the Commission could not rightly demand an easement for the
public to "tramp across the Nollans' backyard." 79 That would be a
taking requiring just compensation.
70. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public
Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 866-67 (1995).
74. Id.
75. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
76. Id. at 837.
77. Id. (Justice Scalia continues: "When that essential nexus is eliminated, the
situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater,
but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.").
78. Id. at 837.
79. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1463.
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Seven years later, the Court augmented its analysis in Dolan v.
City of Tigard." When Florence Dolan wanted to double the size of
her plumbing and electronic supply store and pave its gravel parking
lot, the city made two demands.8s First, because paving her land can
exacerbate flood risks, Dolan must dedicate a portion of her property
that lay within the floodplain to drainage improvements.8 2 Second,
because the expansion could exacerbate traffic congestion, she must
dedicate an additional fifteen feet of land, adjacent to the floodplain,
for a pedestrian/bike path.83 A total of ten percent of her land would
thereby be devoted to city use. s
The Court acknowledged the relevance of the city's aims of flood
and traffic control-thus satisfying the requirement for an "essential
nexus" between the purpose of the zoning law and its application to
the case at hand." The city's demands, however, were out of
proportion to the actual likely impact of Dolan's construction on
flooding and traffic. Specifically, the city's insistence that the
property be a public bike/walk path, rather than a private easement,
exceeded legitimate land-use restriction.87 As a result, Dolan would
lose the right to exclude others from her property, which is an
essential "stick" in her bundle of property rights.8
The city's imposition on Dolan, thus was deemed significantly
disproportionate to her impact on the community. Per the Court,
"[i]t is difficult to see why recreational visitors trampling along
petitioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the city's
legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek,
and the city has not attempted to make any individualized
determination to support this part of its request."89 Thus in Dolan, as
in Nollan:
80. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 380.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 387.
86. Id. at 395.
87. Id. at 393.
88. Id.
89. Id. See also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (likewise
emphasizing the right to exclude).
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Under the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional
conditions,' the government may not require a person
to give up a constitutional right-here the right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for a
public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the benefit sought
has little or no relationship to the property.90
As recently as 2013, the Court reaffirmed both requirements:
essential nexus (germaneness) and proportionality. In Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District, Coy Koontz sought permits
to develop nearly four acres of his fifteen-acre property in Florida.9
Because the project would affect wetlands, he offered to offset
environmental damage with a conservation easement on the
remaining eleven acres. 9 Rejecting this, the St. Johns River Water
Management District required Koontz to either (a) reduce the size of
the development to just 1 acre and grant easement for the other
fourteen acres, or (b) make improvements, at his own expense, to
fifty acres of District land located several miles away."
The Court disapproved: "A predicate for any unconstitutional
conditions claim is that the government could not have
constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it
attempted to pressure that person into doing." 94 Here, assuredly the
government could not have directly ordered Koontz to pay out of
pocket to improve other District lands. That would obviously have
been a taking. To justify doing the same thing indirectly, via placing
conditions on Koontz's proposed land use, the District must satisfy
the Nollan/Dolan criteria. After all, the government "may not
leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental
ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those
impacts. '
Importantly, the Court also held that "[it makes no difference
that no property was actually taken in this case. Extortionate
demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of
90. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
91. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586,2591-92 (2013).
92. Id. at 2589.
93. Id. at 2593.
94. Id. at 2598 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 2595.
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the Takings Clause not because they take property but because they
impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just
compensation."'  Despite no actual taking in this case, the
government still imposed an unconstitutional condition on Koontz.
Admittedly, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions tends to
present a "minefield to be traversed gingerly."' A number of
scholars have offered comprehensive theories; perhaps none are
entirely successful, yet each enlightening." Fortunately, we need not
establish a unified theory of unconstitutional conditions in order to
show that EMTALA represents an unconstitutional condition
imposed on Medicare-contracting hospitals. Koontz and AID, both
decided in 2013, attest that the doctrine is alive and well. Based on
the jurisprudence discussed above, Part III will now elucidate several
elements of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Part IV will
then show that EMTALA imposes an unconstitutional condition on
Medicare-contracting hospitals "impermissibly burden[ing] the right
not to have property taken without just compensation." 99
III. Elements of an Unconstitutional Condition
A. Threshold for Scrutiny
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Koontz, a "predicate for
any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could
not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do
96. Id. at 2589-90 (emphasis added). "The government's demand for property from
a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements even when its
demand is for money." Id. at 2590 (emphasis added).
97. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1416.
98. See Sullivan, supra note 53 (speaking on corporate rights against state regulation,
state autonomy from federal encroachment, and individual rights); but see Hamburger,
supra note 53 (proposing that even if persons may sometimes legitimately agree to waive
individual constitutional rights as a condition for receiving a discretionary government
benefit, some rights are created by, and for the protection of, the people as a whole, and
hence cannot effectively be waived by any individual. These rights set limits on
government powers and can only be changed or waived by the people as a whole). See
generally Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1988); Hamburger, supra note 53; Merrill, supra note 73; Berman, supra note 66; Daniel
A Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract
Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2006); Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984);
Lerner, supra note 68; Wurman, supra note 65.
99. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2590 (citation omitted).
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what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.... [I]f the
government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain
through the permitting process, it would have committed a per se
taking."' And as noted in Dolan: "[H]ad the city simply required
petitioner to dedicate a strip of land ... for public use, rather than
conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on
such a dedication, a taking would have occurred [because] [s]uch
public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude
others."' ' And per Nollan: "Had California simply required the
Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront... rather than
conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to
do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking." 2
The government triggers closer scrutiny when it attempts to
indirectly extract a concession it cannot directly demand. Once this
happens, the inquiry then focuses on whether the condition-the
burden on constitutional rights-can be justified in terms of the goals
of the spending program or regulatory scheme. Justifying such a
burden is roughly parallel to justifying a direct invasion of rights.
Ordinarily, state invasions of constitutionally fundamental rights,
such as freedom of religion, (1) require a compelling government
interest and (2) must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest9
Similarly, justifying a rights-burdening condition on a government
benefit requires that (1) the condition be directly relevant to the
purpose to be achieved by the legislation (essential nexus) and that
(2) the burden imposed on the person be proportionate. These two
criteria are discussed below. Following that, we will discuss the role
of coercion as a pervasive theme in the jurisprudence of
unconstitutional conditions.
100. Id. at 2598-99 (emphasis added). Earlier in the decision, the Court noted: "We
have said in a variety of contexts that 'the government may not deny a benefit to a person
because he exercises a constitutional right."' Id. at 2594.
101. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (citations omitted). The Court
does not waiver, in its recent First Amendment case: "Were it enacted as a direct
regulation of speech, the Policy Requirement [to espouse a policy rejecting prostitution]
would plainly violate the First Amendment. The question is whether the Government
may nonetheless impose that requirement as a condition on the receipt of federal funds."
Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321,2327 (2013).
102. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
103. Hamburger, supra note 53, at 550-51, 554.
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B. Essential Nexus ("Germaneness") to Legislative Purpose
Although government can exact conditions to ensure that
programs and regulations are implemented as intended, Nollan
showed that government cannot tie to its land-use regulations
"strings" that lack connection to the purpose of the regulation.'4
South Dakota v. Dole provides further illustration. Given that the
Constitution generally reserves police powers to the states (including,
for example, where to set the legal drinking age),"5 Dole focused on
whether the federal government could properly use federal highway
funds as leverage to induce states to set their legal drinking age at
twenty-one. If the federal government cannot directly require states
to adopt a particular drinking age, can it tie such an age-requirement
to states' acceptance of federal highway money? It depends on
Congress's purpose for the federal highway program. If age is
relevant to that purpose, then it satisfies the "germaneness"
requirement and may be constitutional. If not, then the government
may have overstepped constitutional boundaries.
In Dole, the Court defined that purpose broadly-to promote
highway safety in general-and thus ruled the drinking age condition
to be sufficiently germane to highway safety to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. However, Justice O'Connor dissented,
defining the program's purpose more narrowly. Emphasizing that,
"Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose
requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money
should be spent."' 6  She identified the highway funds' goal as
promoting highway safety through sound construction. If this is the
purpose, she opined, then mandating a specific drinking age is not
104. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people.").
106. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216. See also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841, which states, "[O]ur cases
describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the police power as a
'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to
the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the
purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective" (emphasis added).
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sufficiently germane to the legislation's goal, and the federal
condition should be ruled unconstitutional. 7
Identifying legislative purpose can, of course, be slippery. As
Chief Justice Roberts observed, "[t]he line is hardly clear, in part
because the definition of a particular program can always be
manipulated to subsume the challenged condition.""'
Here, we also recall Scalia's admonition from Nollan: if the
condition the government imposes does not serve the purpose of the
underlying legislation, then the government is simply leveraging its
power into an extortionate demand."" Hence, the government can
rightly deny a building permit entirely if your development would
cause inordinate flooding, and can rightly make you ameliorate the
flooding you would cause. But it cannot use that power to make you
hand over a large parcel of land for a nice public beach just because
you really need the building permit. The latter would be
extortionate, and unconstitutional as an uncompensated taking.
Interestingly, the same basic reasoning appeared in National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB).11° In this
decision, which largely upheld the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the
one element the Court struck down was the ACA's provision for
expanding Medicaid. The law originally required states participating
in Medicaid to expand eligibility to include all individuals at or below
133% of the federal poverty level, on pain of forfeiting all Medicaid
funding if they did not."' Thus, broad expansion was a "string" tied
to states' continued participation in the program.
107. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 68, at 782. (The Court essentially added a
proportionality element, noting that only five percent of funding was at stake; hence, the
mandate was not unduly coercive.)
108. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328
(2013) (Roberts continues, "We have held, however, that 'Congress cannot recast a
condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First
Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise."').
109. "In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as
the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an
out-and-out plan of extortion."' Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. See also Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2589-90 (2013) ("Extortionate demands for
property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because
they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property
taken without just compensation.").
110. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
111. Id. at 2575.
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Although the Court did not expressly invoke the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, it struck down the Medicaid provision on
the same basic grounds."2 The ACA's Medicaid expansion was "a
shift in kind, not merely degree. The original program was designed
to cover medical services for four specific categories of the needy: the
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent
children."" 3  Expanding the program to encompass every indigent
man, woman, and child below a specified income threshold was not a
mere alteration or amendment to the program; it was a dramatic
transformation that exceeded Congress's authority.'14 "As we have
explained, '[t]hough Congress' power to legislate under the spending
power is broad, it does not include surprising participating States with
post-acceptance or 'retroactive' conditions."" "5 In essence, the Court
complained that Congress had imposed a new condition on
continuing to participate in Medicaid--one that was not sufficiently
germane to the program as originally conceived.
C. Proportionality
The proportionality criterion emphasizes that, even if a
particular burden on a constitutional right is permissible in principle
(that is, sufficiently germane to the underlying legislative purpose),
that burden must not be excessive. In Dolan, Koontz, and Dole, the
Court figured the proportionality criterion into its analysis. For
example, one of the Dole Court's major justifications for upholding
the drinking-age condition was that a mere five percent of highway
funds was implicated. 6  The Dole Court reasoned, "[I]n some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be
so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion.""' 7 However, the Court did distinguish "relatively mild
encouragement" from coercion.'
8
112. Id. at 2604-05.
113. Id. at 2605-06.
114. Id. at 2606-07.
115. Id. at 2606 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25
(1981)).
116. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,211 (1987).
117. Id.
118. "[T]he argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.... Here
Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to the States to enact higher
minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose. But the enactment of such
laws remains the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact." Id. at 211-12.
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The Court in NFIB likewise invoked proportionality. "9 There,
the disproportionate impact on states' budgets loomed large in the
Court's decision that the Medicaid portion of the ACA was
unconstitutional. °12  Given the program's financial significance to
states, with a potential loss of over ten percent of states' overall
budget, the Court held that a complete revocation of Medicaid funds
would go too far.
12 1
D. Coercion
Even though the Court has not directly identified coercion as an
express criterion for unconstitutional conditions, the aforementioned
cases all emphasize coercion. Indeed, the concept of coercion links
the major criteria. A lack of germaneness can render a condition
extortionate. Disproportionality becomes unduly coercive, as the
government uses its substantial power to extract more than a
legitimate concession from the person in exchange for some
government benefit. Consider the following examples from Home,'
Koontz,'123 and NFIB.
2 4
In Home, the Court stated:
119. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012).
120. It may be argued that, in the case of public hospitals, EMTALA's
unconstitutionality takes a somewhat different form than for private hospitals. As
discussed in Morreim, Dumping the 'Anti-Dumping' Law, 15 MINN.J. L. ScI. &TECH. 212,
269-70 (2013), public hospitals can argue that EMTALA wrongfully commandeers states
(or localities) to do federal business. In this sense, commandeering might be deemed the
particular and somewhat distinctive type of unconstitutional condition imposed on public
hospitals. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that the federal
government cannot commandeer a states' resources to implement the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act). "The Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation
had persuaded them that using the States as the instruments of federal governance was
both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict .... [T]he Framers rejected the
concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States . I..." Id  at
919. The great innovation of this design was that "our citizens would have two political
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other"-"a
legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government,
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it." Id. at 920 (quoting U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
121. Id. at 2604 ("Medicaid spending accounts for over twenty percent of the average
State's total budget, with federal funds covering fifty to eighty-three percent of those
costs.").
122. Home v. USDA, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
123. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
124. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566.
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The Government contends that the reserve
requirement is not a taking because raisin growers
voluntarily choose to participate in the raisin
market.... [T]he Government is wrong as a matter of
law.... The taking here cannot reasonably be
characterized as part of a similar voluntary exchange.' 25
Also consider three important outcomes from Koontz: (1) the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine vindicates the Constitution's
enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing
people into giving them up; (2) Nollan and Dolan represent a special
application of this doctrine that protects the Fifth Amendment right
to just compensation for property the government takes when owners
apply for land-use permits; and (3) the standard set out in Nollan and
Dolan reflects the danger of governmental coercion in this context
while accommodating the government's legitimate need to offset the
public costs of development through land use exactions.26
Finally, NFIB represents an instance of obvious coercion, where
the government's forcing states to expand Medicaid or lose ten
percent of their entire budget was deemed a gun to the head, not
"relatively mild encouragement. 127
In sum, conditions placed on federal spending cross a line when
they become leverage to extract concessions that reach beyond the
legitimate legislative purpose of the federal program.' 28 EMTALA
125. Home 135 S. Ct. at 2430.
126. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2588-96 (2013) ("As in other unconstitutional conditions
cases in which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive
pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally
cognizable injury."). The same reasoning emerged in the First Amendment context, for
instance in AID. "In the present context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from
our cases is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending
program-those that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize-and conditions
that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program
itself." Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 2321,2328 (2013).
Note that this passage emphasizes speech because AID focused on First Amendment
issues.
127. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 211) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
128. For broader discussions of the role of coercion in the jurisprudence of
unconstitutional conditions, see Sullivan, supra note 53; Epstein, supra note 99;
Hamburger, supra note 53; Merrill, supra note 73; Berman, supra note 66; Farber, supra
note 98; Kreimer, supra note 98, at 1304; Lerner, supra note 68; Wurman, supra note 65.
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represents just such overreaching, and therefore places an
unconstitutional condition on Medicare-contracting hospitals.
IV. EMTALA as an Unconstitutional Condition of Medicare
A. Threshold to Scrutiny
As with the unconstitutional conditions cases discussed above,
the threshold trigger for scrutiny is easily met: The government is
attempting to extract something indirectly, which it clearly could not
demand directly. EMTALA requires hospitals to hand out goods and
services to people who come to their EDs, often for no compensation
whatsoever. If directly mandated, this would violate the Takings
Clause. Hence, we must next inquire whether, if imposed indirectly
as a condition of participating in Medicare, EMTALA satisfies the
requirements of germaneness and proportionality and whether it
imposes undue coercion.
B. Germaneness
As noted, legitimate conditions arise from the program's
purpose, to ensure that money is used as intended. Illegitimate
conditions are those that would leverage the funds to regulate
conduct outside the contours of the program."3
129. It might be observed that the existing case law regarding the Fifth Amendment
and unconstitutional conditions applies the doctrine only to cases involving land-use
regulation. This does not entail that land use is the only possible or permissible Fifth
Amendment application. As the Court noted in Koontz, "land-use permit applicants are
especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is
worth far more than property it would like to take." 133 S. Ct. at 2594. For instance, in
the Dolan case, the economic value of granting a 15-foot easement for a bike path was not
large, hence presented the city with a tempting target because the value of expanding the
store and paving the parking lot would be worth far more to Florence Dolan than the
financial loss of the easement. Because of that enhanced vulnerability, the Court went on
to emphasize that "[e]xtortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment
right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them."
Additionally and also in Koontz, the Court observed that land is not the only sort of
property that could be the focus of an unconstitutional taking. Money itself qualifies, as
do other kinds of property such as liens. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601.
130. "In the present context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases
is between conditions that define the limits of the government spending program-those
that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize-and conditions that seek to
leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself." Agency
for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013). Beyond
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So what are the purpose and contours of Medicare? Public Law
89-97, enacted July 30, 1965, amended the Social Security Act "[t]o
provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social
Security Act with a supplementary medical benefits program and an
expanded program of medical assistance, to increase benefits under
the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance System, to improve
the Federal-State public assistance programs, and for other
purposes.'
131
The program's primary purpose, then, is to provide medical
insurance to people over age sixty-five, plus those with certain
disabilities such as end-stage renal disease.'32 Medicare describes
extensive "conditions of participation" for hospitals, providing
detailed guidance on such issues as the quality of facilities,
qualifications of various types of providers, and the like.'33 Even a
cursory look shows that these generally aim to ensure that federal
funds are spent as intended: to provide an appropriate quality and
quantity of care to elderly and disabled beneficiaries, with proper
financial accounting for program integrity.
Twenty years later, Congress imposed EMTALA on Medicare-
contracting hospitals, expressly outside the program's contours:
Medical Screening Requirement.-In the case of a
hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if
any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits
under this title) comes to the emergency department
and a request is made on the individual's behalf for
examination or treatment for a medical condition, the
hospital must provide for an appropriate medical
screening examination within the capability of the
hospital's emergency department, including ancillary
services routinely available to the emergency
department, to determine whether or not an
this, program requirements can become an "out-and-out plan of extortion." Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
131. The Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, Medicare Part A insures
access to hospital services; Part B was then created to cover physician services, outpatient
services and related care; Part C offers Medicare Advantage (managed care) plans, while
most recently Part D provides drug coverage.
132. The statute is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2015) et seq.
133. 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2015).
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emergency medical condition (within the meaning of
subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists."M
Necessary Stabilizing Treatment for Emergency
Medical Conditions and Labor.-
(1) In general.-If any individual (whether or not
eligible for benefits under this title) comes to a hospital
and the hospital determines that the individual has an
emergency medical condition, the hospital must
provide either-
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the
hospital, for such further medical examination
and such treatment as may be required to
stabilize the medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another
medical facility in accordance with subsection
(c).135
Hospitals with specialized facilities, such as burn units and newborn
intensive care, even absent an ED, must also accept those in need.
Again, recipients of these services need not be otherwise eligible for
benefits under Medicare. 36
The chasm between Medicare's statutorily defined purposes and
EMTALA's demands is quite stunning. Indeed, EMTALA makes no
pretense to focus on the Medicare's main statutory focus-the
elderly. After all, the elderly already had insurance by the time the
law was passed (Medicare), and their eligibility for services in the ED
and elsewhere is usually not difficult to detect; wrinkles and gray hair
give it away.
We are again reminded of NFIB. There, the ACA's Medicaid
expansion constituted, not a mere alteration or amendment to the
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (emphasis added).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(g). See also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(f): "A participating hospital
that has specialized capabilities or facilities (including, but not limited to, facilities such as
burn units, shock-trauma units, NICUs, or, (with respect to rural areas), regional referral
centers which, for purposes of this subpart, mean hospitals meeting the requirements of
referral centers found at §412.96 of this chapter) may not refuse to accept from a referring
hospital within the boundaries of the United States an appropriate transfer of an
individual who requires such specialized capabilities or facilities if the receiving hospital
has the capacity to treat the individual."
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program, but a dramatic transformation that plainly exceeded
Congress's authority.1 37 Surely EMTALA represents an even greater
deviation from Medicare's avowed purpose, an even more dramatic
transformation of the program. After all, the ACA's Medicaid
expansion still focused on the poor. EMTALA, in contrast, turned
away from the elderly and disabled, to a completely different
population-anyone needing emergency care or specialty services.
Clearly, EMTALA's remarkable expansion of responsibilities cannot
plausibly be deemed "germane" to Medicare's statutory focus on the
elderly and disabled.
C. Proportionality
This Article is not the setting in which to establish definitively
whether EMTALA's burden on hospitals is disproportionate to the
benefit they receive by being paid to care for elderly and disabled
persons. We can, however, describe how the comparison might
proceed.
On one side of the ledger, we list hospitals' revenues from
Medicare.138 The threat for failing to accept EMTALA, after all, is
exclusion from Medicare. On the other side, we tally uncompensated
EMTALA and EMTALA-generated goods and services. If the
burdens of EMTALA compliance are significantly out of proportion
to the benefits of participating in Medicare, then we would conclude
EMTALA fails the Court's proportionality requirement.
Here are a few figures. For 2013, Medicare's total benefit
payments amounted to $583 billion, of which twenty-five percent
went to hospitals for inpatient services, and another six percent for
hospital outpatient services-for a total of just over $180 billion. "9 It
is not clear whether this represents generous, adequate, or inadequate
compensation for hospitals' services, because we do not know
hospitals' baseline costs for providing such care. One thing we do
know is that, as the ACA is implemented, hospital payments are
decreasing-1.1% per year starting in 2011 and diminishing further
137. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012).
138. The total Medicare side includes money paid to care for Medicare beneficiaries,
plus certain extra payments Medicare makes, such as for graduate medical education. For
a more detailed discussion of payment issues. See Morreim, supra note 6, at 247-70.
139. Kaiser Family Foundation, The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing
(2015), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-spending-and-financing-fact-sheet/
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for the next decade." Additionally, the so-called "disproportionate
share" ("DSH") payments for hospitals providing higher amounts of
uncompensated care ' are slated to decrease by about seventy-five
percent under the ACA, based on the Act's presumption that the
number of uninsured and under-insured people would fall
dramatically.
42
On the EMTALA side, according to one estimate, the overall
burden of uncompensated ED care alone is roughly $6 billion per143
year. Emergency care represents just under two percent of the
nation's $2.4 trillion in health expenditures, or about $12 billion per
144year. Of this, over half is uncompensated, 15 since one in five
patients is uninsured" and many of those who are uninsured come to
140. Melanie Evans, Reform Update: Hospitals Slash Labor Costs to Make up for Lost
Medicare Revenue. Modern Healthcare (2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article
/20131009/NEWS/310099963# (citing Chapin White, Vivian Yaling Wu, How Do Hospitals
Cope with Sustained Slow Growth in Medicare Prices? 49 Health Servs. Research 11
(2014)).
141. The Medicaid DSH ("disproportionate share hospital") program was initiated in
1981 to help acute care hospitals, and some psychiatric hospitals, defray the costs for
hospitals serving particularly large numbers of low-income patients. Payments are made
to states, which in turn distribute the funds to hospitals. In 2011, these payments totaled
$11.3 Billion. The Medicare DSH program, established in 1986, paid out $10.8 Billion in
2010. See Robert E. Mechanic, Medicaid's Disproportionate Share Hospital Program:
Complex Structure, Critical Payments, NHPF BACKGROUND PAPER (Nat'l Health Policy
Forum, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 14, 2004, at 1, http://www.nhpf.org/library/background-
papers/BPMedicaidDSH_09-14-04.pdf; Christie Provost . Peters, Medicaid
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments (Nat'l Health Policy Forum, Wash.
D.C.), June 15, 2009, at 1, http://www.nhpf.org/library/the-basics/BasicsDSH_06-15-
09.pdf; Meeting Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 148, 157 (Jan. 3, 2011); JOHN R. JACOB ET AL., THE
MEDICARE DSH ADJUSTMENT 7 (2012), http://www. healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/
Materials/DocumentsfMM12/papers/ Mjacob .etal-slides.pdf.
142. John A. Graves, Medicaid Expansion Opt-Outs and Uncompensated Care. 367
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2365 (2012). The impact of these reductions is expected to be
particularly great in states opting to forego Medicaid expansion in 2014.
143. Id.
144. American College of Emergency Physicians, Costs of Emergency Care Fact Sheet,
(http://newsroom.acep.org/fact .. sheets), http://newsroom.acep.org/index.php?s=20301 &
item=29928; American College of Emergency Physicians, The Uninsured: Access to
Medical Care, Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.acep.org/News-Media-top-bannerFhe-Un
insured-Access-To-Medical-Care/.
145. Id.; American College of Emergency Physicians, The Uninsured: Access to
Medical Care, Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.acep.org/News-Media-top-banner/The-Uninsured
-AccessTo-Medical-Care/.
146. The CDC reported that nineteen percent of all emergency patients in 2009 were
uninsured. See CDC, National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey Factsheet:
Emergency Department, (2009), http://www.acep.org/uploadedFiles/ACEP/newsroom/
NewsMediaResources/StatisticsData/2009%20NHAMCS-ED-FactsheetED.pdf.
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the ER at a stage of illness or injury more serious than it might have
been if cared for at an earlier, primary care stage.'47 A 2007 study in
Annals of Emergency Medicine reported that overall payment for ED
charges decreased from fifty-seven percent in 1996 to forty-two
percent in 2004.148
Uncompensated EMTALA expenditures do not end in the ER.
As noted, ongoing care of an unstable patient who must be admitted
as an inpatient is still an EMTALA-generated cost, because the
hospital cannot simply transfer an indigent patient to some other
hospital, so long as that person is unstable.1 49 Between 2005 and 2011,
inpatient admissions preceded by an ED visit rose from sixty-two
percent to sixty-nine percent.'5 ° Then, we must add uncompensated
EMTALA-mandated specialty care, provided in NICUs, shock-
trauma units, burn units, and the like.15  Although precise numbers
are unavailable, it is plausible to suppose that EMTALA's ED, plus
ED-generated and specialty care, expenses could easily exceed $18
billion-ten percent of hospitals' Medicare revenues.
It is difficult to discern, without more information, whether
EMTALA's uncompensated costs are disproportionate to the overall
benefit (revenues) hospitals earn by caring for Medicare
Admittedly, higher numbers of patients were insured in 2014, perhaps because of the
ACA. However, that rise may or may not be permanent in future years.
147. Institute of Medicine, America's Uninsured Crisis: Consequences for Health and
Health Care. Report Brief, (February 2009), http://iom.nationalacademies.org/-/media/
Files/Report %20Files/2009/Americas-Uninsured-Crisis-Consequences-for-Health-and-
Health-Care/Americas%20Uninsured%2OCrisis%202009%2OReport%2OBrief.pdf.
148. Renee Y. Hsia, Donna Maclsaac, Laurence C. Baker, Decreasing Reimburse-
ments for Outpatient Emergency Department Visits Across Payer Groups from 1996 to
2004. 51 ANN. EMERG. MED. 265 (2008).
149. Unstable patients, of course, generally require the most expensive kinds of care.
150. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Health Care Spending and the
Medicare Program, June 2013, at 70, http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Junl3Data
BookEntireReport.pdf.
151. A powerful example comes from twenty years ago. In Matter of Baby K, 16 F.3d
590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit held, based on EMTALA, that a hospital must do
whatever was necessary to sustain the life of an anencephalic infant, including placing her
on a ventilator in the intensive care unit if necessary. Anencephaly is a condition in which
the entire brain and a significant portion of the cranium, except for the brain stem, are
missing. Because the person has no cerebrum, he or she is permanently unconscious.
Baby K survived nearly two and a half years. Although this particular patient was insured
and was able to live without ventilator support for at least some of her life, an uninsured
anencephalic who needed constant intensive care would create a formidable expense for a
hospital-all of it EMTALA generated, even though virtually none of it actually in the
ER. See Morreim, supra note 6, at 227-29.
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beneficiaries. Perhaps it is not disproportionate, if hospitals'
Medicare payments are otherwise generous-significantly in excess of
the fair market costs of providing services to Medicare beneficiaries.
However, if Medicare payments barely cover the costs of providing
services to the elderly and disabled, leaving no excess, then we might
well conclude that the billions EMTALA generates in
uncompensated costs are out of proportion to the "benefit" of being
paid barely enough. It is largely an empirical question best left for
another day.
D. Coercion
Overall, Medicare represents more than thirty percent of many
hospitals' budgets,"' while Medicare and Medicaid together account
for about fifty-five percent of their revenues.5 ' Here, the Court's
analysis in NFIB is instructive. The Court struck down the ACA's
Medicaid expansion requirement, partly because a threat to withdraw
the funds that represented ten percent of states' budgets would
amount to "economic dragooning," "gun to the head" coercion."
Twenty years after hospitals had come to rely on it as an integral
part of their business model, EMTALA was imposed as a "do it or
leave" imperative. If threatening a mere ten percent of states'
budgets constitutes an inordinate threat, then surely a threat to
eliminate thirty percent of hospitals revenues would be at least as
outsized, as a penalty for failing to fulfill EMTALA's obligations.
Conclusion
If EMTALA fails, either the germaneness test or the
proportionality test (either alone is sufficient'), it is unconstitutional.
And as the Court emphasized in 2013: "[T]he relevant distinction that
has emerged from our cases is between conditions that define the
152. As of 2002, the two programs comprised just over forty-seven percent of hospital
revenues-approximately thirty percent from Medicare and seventeen percent from
Medicaid. Tammy Lundstrom, Under-Reimbursement of Medicaid and Medicare
Hospitalizations as an Unconstitutional Taking of Hospital Services, 50 WAYNE L. REV.
1243, 1248 (2004).
153. Robert Pear, Administration Offers Health Care Cuts as Part of Budget
Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/us/05deficit.
html?pagewanted=all.
154. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012).
155. As seen in case law such as Nollan, a lack of germaneness alone, or as in Dolan a
disproportionality alone, would be sufficient to find a condition unconstitutional.
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limits of the government spending program-those that specify the
activities Congress wants to subsidize-and conditions that seek to
leverage funding to regulate ... outside the contours of the program
itself.
, 15 6
As the Court pointed out in AID, "the distinction drawn in these
cases-between conditions that define the federal program and those
that reach outside it-is not always self-evident."'' 7 Nevertheless, it
can still be possible to discern in a particular case that a condition on
federal funding falls on the wrong side of the line.'
Twenty years after hospitals became financially dependent on
this program that was expressly focused on insuring healthcare for
elderly and disabled beneficiaries, the federal government leveraged
that dependence to extract an arguably outsized commitment for a
completely different population: anyone who visits an ED or who
needs specialty services. The price of continuing to participate in
Medicare became a none-too-voluntary abdication of hospitals' Fifth
Amendment right against uncompensated takings.
If the "line" is defined by the use of leverage to extract
conditions that exceed the contours of the government program,
EMTALA clearly falls on the wrong side of that line, "impermissibly
burden[ing] the right not to have property taken without just
compensation."'59 It is therefore unconstitutional.
So what's next? The answer is quite simple: The government
that mandates systematic takings must ensure they are justly
compensated.W
156. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328
(2013). The word "speech" is deleted because although the case refers to First
Amendment speech protections, the Court's message is broader. Applicable case law
makes it clear that this distinction applies to whichever protected constitutional right is
being burdened.
157. Id. at 2330.
158. As the Court went on to say in AID: "Here, however, we are confident that the
Policy Requirement falls on the unconstitutional side of the line." Id.
159. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2590 (2013).
160. Morreim, supra note 6, at 257-70. Patients have the first obligation to pay for
their care. However, if patients cannot or will not pay, whether directly or via insurance,
then the government that mandates the services must stand as guarantor of the
compensation it has mandated.
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